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THE EXPANSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SHOE DOCTRINE-Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Shaffer v. Heitner,' the Supreme Court joins judicial and
scholarly advocates in the destruction of the distinction between in
personam and in rem jurisdiction. Traditionally, the presence of the
person or the res formed the basis of the court's power over the
dispute. 2 While in rem and quasi in rem actions have continued to
be established in this manner, in personam jurisdiction incorporates
additional considerations of due process in determining the extent
of a court's power. 3 Shaffer adopts this standard for all other types
of actions as well, thereby limiting a distressing trend in some courts
to stretch in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction to its constitutional
limits.,
Following Shaffer, jurisdiction in all types of actions, whether
in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem, will be measured by considerations of "fair play and substantial justice," a concept set out in the
landmark case InternationalShoe v. Washington.' For in rem and
quasi in rem actions, it will no longer be sufficient merely to find
property within a court's jurisdiction. Instead, the court must determine whether it would be equitable for the non-resident owner of the
property to be subject to the court's power.

II.

BACKGROUND

Actions have traditionally been divided into three categories: in
rem, quasi in rem, and in personam. Although the line of separation
often becomes blurred, courts have always relied on these distinctions in order to determine the extent of their power over litigants.
In rem actions are those which directly affect the rights in a
particular piece of property, tangible or intangible, located within
the court's territory. It is binding not only upon the litigants, but
upon the entire world. Strict in rem actions are relatively rare, and
courts often use the term in rem for quasi in rem actions as well.
Quasi in rem actions are also based upon the presence of property within the forum state's boundaries. However, that property is
1. 433 U.S. 186, (1977).
2. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
3. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Buckeye Boiler
Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113
(1969).
4. See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
5. 326 U.S. at 316, quoting from Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, at 463 (1940).
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not the subject of the action, but is merely used by the plaintiff in
order to obtain a judgment against a non-resident owner to the
extent of his interest in that property. Such judgment is only binding upon a party to the suit. Pennoyer v. Neff' set the standard
applied for such actions. So long as there is attachment of the property prior to the proceeding, as well as service by publication, there
is sufficient basis to determine the interests of the owner in that
property.'
The traditional basis for in personam jurisdiction has been the
presence of the person, as long as there has been proper service of
process In place of this requirement, which is difficult to satisfy,
two interacting standards have gained acceptance following the
leading case, International Shoe. In determining whether a nonresident corporation was subject to the court's power, the Supreme
Court measured "the quality and nature of the corporation's activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws" of
the forum state.9 The corporation's activities in the state must be
of such breadth that it would reasonably expect to be subject to the
state's laws. In addition, there must be certain minimum "contacts,
ties or relations."' 0 This is to ensure the fairness of subjecting the
corporation to the court's jurisdiction. Subsequent decisions have
found sufficient ties on the basis of the commission of a tortious act
within the state," or a contract that had a "substantial connection"' 2 with the state. It is this two-part standard which the Shaffer
Court has extended to cover in rem and quasi in rem actions as well.
III.

SHAFFER

v.

HEITNER

Heitner, a non-resident of Delaware, brought a derivative suit
against Greyhound and Greyhound Lines, two Delaware corporations, and their officers and directors.' 3 He charged the defendants
with mismanagement resulting in a judgment against the corpora6. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
7. See, e.g., Minichello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
844 (1969); Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967),
reargument denied per curiam, 21 N.Y.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 1914 (1968); Seider v. Roth, 17
N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
8. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). However transiently the defendant may
have been within the state, so long as the service of process is correct, the court may obtain
proper jurisdiction.
9. 326 U.S. at 319.
10. Id. at 320.
11. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
12. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
13. 433 U.S. at 189-90.
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tion in an antitrust suit, and a fine in a criminal contempt action.
In order to obtain jurisdiction over the defendants, who were nonresidents, Heitner obtained a sequestration order for about 82,000
shares of Greyhound stock belonging to 19 of the defendants. He was
able to do this because of a unique Delaware statute 4 which allows
quasi in rem jurisdiction over stock owned by non-resident parties
in any company incorporated under state laws. If the non-residents
wish to protect their stock, they must make an appearance in the
state court, thus rendering them subject to the court's general
power. 5 In this way, the state gains personal jurisdiction over parties it could not have otherwise reached.
The court of chancery, as well as the Delaware Supreme Court,
ruled against the defendants' contentions that the Delaware statute
violated due process, and that the standard of InternationalShoe
should be applicable to proceedings quasi in rem." The United
States Supreme Court reversed, stating that, not only are quasi in
rem actions subject to the International Shoe standard, but "all
assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to
standards set forth in InternationalShte and its progeny. ' '
The rationale of the decision was based on the premise that the
old distinction between quasi in rem and personal actions is largely
illusory, 8 and that a party's rights are affected regardless of whether
they are based on a piece of property or not. The Court found that
InternationalShoe has proven to be a very workable and much more
equitable standard than the traditional one and therefore should
replace it. Where there are insufficient contacts, the court must not
extend its power over a party simply because he owns something
within its boundaries. In this case the Court determined that the
defendants had no contacts at all with the state beyond the "situs"
of the Greyhound stock. Therefore, Delaware could not assert jurisdiction over them. 9

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Dissolution of In Rem and In Personam Distinctions
The Shaffer holding reverses a formidable line of cases that

14. DEL. CODE, tit.VII,§ 169 (1975).
15. DEL. CODE, tit.X,§ 366 (1975). Justice Powell points out that Delaware is the only
state which has such a law, 97 S. Ct. at 2588 (concurring opinion). See Note, Attachment of
Corporate Stock: The Conflicting Approaches of Delaware and the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1579 (1960).
16. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (1976).
17. 433 U.S. at 212 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 207.
19. Id. at 213-17.
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followed the "time-honored method of procedure . . . [of] . . .
adhering logically to the ancient distinction" 0 between personal
and property actions. Ever since Pennoyer" clearly separated the
treatment that should be accorded to the two types of proceedings,
most American courts have followed this distinction. The Delaware
courts consequently refused to discuss the problem beyond the conclusion that since Shaffer is a quasi in rem proceeding and
InternationalShoe was only applicable to personal actions, the two
should not be analyzed in the same manner. Even before Shaffer,
however, the Supreme Court had disregarded this historic distinction in ruling on the notice requirements for beneficiaries of a judicial settlement of a trust. Once a court has obtained jurisdiction
over the parties or property, its power to decide the controversy is
still incomplete until proper service of process has been achieved.
In Mullane v. CentralBank & Trust Co.2 the Court said that, if at
all possible, an effort must be made to notify the defendants of the
proceedings. This brought in rem-quasi in rem proceedings away
from the Pennoyer principle that notice by publication is sufficient,
and closer to the notice required in personal actions. The Mullane
court explained its reasoning:
It is not readily apparent how the courts of New York did or would
classify the present proceeding, which has some characteristics and
is wanting in some features of proceedings both in rem and in
personam. But in any event we think that the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution do not depend
upon a classification for which the standards are so elusive and confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts to define,
may and do vary from state to state. . . . [W]e do not rest the power
of the State to resort to constructive service in this proceeding upon
how its courts or this Court may regard this historic antithesis.3
The value of the Shaffer holding is most clearly illustrated in
those actions, such as Mullane, where the court has trouble classifying the applicable type of jurisdiction. 4 Rather than attempting to
determine the nature of the action, the court can immediately get
to the heart of the problem by weighing the relative' equities of
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 108 (1921).
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
23. Id. at 312-13 (emphasis added). See also Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S.
112 (1965), and Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), which held that mere
notice by publication is insufficient for in rem proceedings where the defendants could have
been personally notified.
24. See, e.g., U.S. Industries v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 .
Ct. 2972 (1977). This case involves the same Delaware statute as Shaffer.
20.
21.
22.
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adjudicating the case in the particular forum.
Several lower court decisions have foreshadowed the Shaffer
rationale, placing little value in exercising jurisdiction merely because of the existence of property in their territories. A notable
example is Atkinson v. Superior Court25 in which Justice Traynor
upheld quasi in rem jurisdiction over a New York trustee, not
through establishing some theoretical situs of an obligation within
California, but by examining the activities of the trustee in order
to find some sort of justification through minimum contacts.
In a subsequent law review article, Justice Traynor followed up
the Atkinson case with a proposal for a test based on minimum
contacts.26 He heartily endorsed the movement to abolish "state
statutes that prattle of 'in rem' or impose outdated tests.
B.

Recent Quasi In Rem Trends

The Shaffer case, although consistent with the trend in personal actions, flies in the face of quasi in rem development." In this
area courts have often gone to great lengths to obtain jurisdiction
by disregarding due process and practical considerations and conjuring up the theoretical "presence" of an intangible concept. For
example, the famous textbook case of Harris v. Balk 9 established
court jurisdiction by attaching a debt personified in the nonresident defendant's debtor, who had just happened to pass through
3°
the plaintiff's state.
New York courts have been especially eager to take advantage
of this way of extending their powers. Their method originated with
Seider v. Roth, 31 a case that involved a New Yorker who was injured
outside the state by a Canadian. In a four-to-three decision, the
court held it could attach as a "debt" a New York insurance company's duty to defend the Canadian policyholder. As the dissenters
pointed out, the obligation to defend furnished the jurisdiction for
a suit brought in order to determine that very issue. 2 The ultimate
25. 49 Ca l.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1955), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom.
Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
26. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TEx. L. REv. 657 (1969). For other
legal writers advocating the elimination of the in rem-in personam difference, see, e.g., Von
Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1121 (1966); Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction,1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241
(1965), Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The Power Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
27. Traynor, supra note 26, at 662.
28. See note 7 supra.
29. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
30. Id. at 224-26.
31. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
32. Id.
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effect of this type of reasoning is the establishment of personal jurisdiction over the insurer on a quasi in rem basis. Although this appears to present constitutional due process problems, the Seider
decision was upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals."
Shaffer implicitly overrules the Seider line of reasoning by
making the situs merely a factor to be considered in the search for
the proper forum. Due process prohibits the courts from using quasi
in rem jurisdiction as a tool to further their own power without
considering possible unfairness to the out-of-state defendant.
Therefore where, as in Seider, the insurance company has no other
ties with the forum state,34 under the Shaffer standard, the court
may not exercise power on the company's obligation to defend.
C.

The Scope of Shaffer

The Supreme Court does not limit its holding to fact situations
similar to that in Shaffer. In every case, whether in rem, quasi in
rem, or in personam, courts must use the InternationalShoe standard. However, the Court immediately mentions two possible exceptions.3 5 The first situation is where "a State in which property is
located should have jurisdiction to attach that property by use of
proper procedures, as security for a judgment being sought in a
forum where the litigation can be maintained consistently with
InternationalShoe." 3 The sequestration process could still be used
if there is danger the defendant would remove his assets from the
reach of the successful plaintiff. This exception would become
applicable where there is a possibility the defendant will remove his
assets completely out of the country.
After Shaffer, CaliforniaPower & Light Co. v. Uranex3' upheld
attachment of a foreign company's only assets in the United States,
in a state other than that of the suit's location, because of this
danger. In cases such as this, Shaffer allows attachment of property
without regard to minimum contacts where the court would be powerless to enforce its judgment in any other manner.
The second possible exception the Court discussed is a real
3
In these cases the state has a very
property strict in rem actionY.
strong interest in providing a judicial resolution of property disputes
within its boundaries.3" Minimum contacts would include records
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Minichello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (1969).
Seider v. Roth, 117 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
433 U.S. at 207-08.
Id. at 210 (footnote omitted).
46 U.S.L.W. 2194 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 26, 1977).
433 U.S. at 207.
Id.
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and witnesses, which are usually located in the state in which the
property is found. '0 The Shaffer Court concludes that these factors
will ordinarily make it fair and equitable for the state to exercise
jurisdiction over the property in any case, thus satisfying the
International Shoe test. This analysis demonstrates that it is unclear whether traditional in rem actions are to be considered as an
exception to the general rule, or whether they would have been
affected even if the rule is applied.
V.

CONCLUSION

There are underlying problems with the Shaffer doctrine which
soon become apparent. Courts are so accustomed to using the historic labels of in rem and in personam as conclusions, and not
merely factual considerations, in determining the proper forum,
that there is bound to be confusion in the analytic process. The
Shaffer Court itself, although it attempts to dissolve the differences
between in rem and personal actions, emphasizes the dichotomy in
pointing out that real property in rem actions may not be covered
by its rule.
Confusion in application as well as analysis may also result
because the Court created a general rule out of a case that involves
only one type of fact situation among hundreds of possibilities. The
concurring opinions demonstrated immediate differences as to the
extent of the majority holding." The fact that the first case to follow
Shaffer falls under the exception to the rule adds to the complex42
ity.
The safest prediction of the impact of the Shaffer decision is
that the cases will follow the pattern set by in personam suits. Each
situation will be determined separately, for in different cases the
elements will take on varying significances. Although the analysis
may be time consuming, it is also more equitable.
Shaffer is the first major step towards a dramatic change in the
method of determining a court's jurisdiction. It establishes a universal standard that incorporates new due process considerations into
the traditional concern for physical presence. In adopting the
International Shoe standard, it effectively halted a trend in quasi
in rem actions to extend a court's power despite great injustices. It
also set out a standard which can be applied consistently and with
40.
41.
42.
1977).

Id.
Id. at 217-19 (Stevens, J.).
California Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 46 U.S.L.W. 2194 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 26,
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relative ease in all types of actions. The threshold question will no
longer be: Where is the defendant's property located?; but rather:
Is it fair and just to adjudicate the defendant's interests in the
forum?
Victoria Wilson
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